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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
OPAL WHITLOCK, 
Plaintiff and Respondents, 
OLD AMERICAN INSURANCE COM-
PANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Nature of The Case 
Case No. 11019 
The nature of this case amounts to the interpreta-
lion of an insurance policy. The issue date of the policy 
was 3 April 1961, in which Old American Insurance Com-
pany, defendant and appellant, issued a limited policy 
to the insured Arthur Whitlock, General Delivery, En-
terprise, Utah, with the beneficiary, Opal Whitlock his 
wife. Arthur Whitlock had purchased this policy which 
was a very limited accident insurance policy which 
contained the provision Part Three: 
"This policy does not cover any loss or disability 
resulting directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, 
from {a) any mental or bodily sickness or disease .. " 
Mr. Whitlock died in the Iron County Hospital on 
or about the 18th day of October, 1962, after having 
been under disability for several months from an opera-
tion in which one lung had been removed because of 
cancer. At the time of the death, Mr. Whitlock had been 
suffering from cancer, and on the 24th of September, 
1962, was involved in an automobile accident while en-
route to the Iron City Hospital for either a cold or the 
('ancer, as the case may be, in an automobile driven by 
his son. He was in the hospital until the 18th day of 
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October, 1962, at which time he died. The death certifi-
cate said "Metastatic Carcinoma" which is cancer and 
made no mention whatsoever of any injury as a resuit 
of the accident. Later on in preparation of the lawsuit 
plaintiff submitted four claims P .. Ex. 5, G, 7 and 8, i~ 
which the principal cause of death was listed as metas-
tatic carcinoma, with the secondary e:ause of death in 
three of them listed as injuries from the accident. The 
defendant insurance company tendered $2'72.00 for hos-
pitalization, under the theory that he had been in the 
hospital because of the accident, but refused to pay 
$2400.00 for loss of life benefit under the terms of the 
policy. The primary question to be determined under the 
terms of this policy was whether or not the death was 
under the loss of life provisions of the policy. 
Disposition in Lower Court 
This case was tried before a jury in Parowan, Iron 
County, State of Utah on 21 December, 1966. The jury 
brought in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $2400. 
Thereafter a judgment in line with this verdict, or a 
judgment on the verdict was entered after defendant 
had filed a motion for judgment n. o. v. and an alterna-
tive motion for a new trial, both of which were denied 
by the trial court. 
Relief Sought on Appeal 
The defendant-appellant seeks a modification of this 
judgment in that instead of being a judgment for $2400.-
00, same should be a judgment against the defendant-
appellant in the sum of $272.00 without interest and less 
costs of court and costs of appeal incurred by the defent-
ant-appellant, the defendant insurance company having 
previously tendered the $272.00 within a reasonable per-
iod after the hospitalization of Arthur Whitlock. 
Statement of Facts 
It is the position of the defendant-appellant that the 
facts in the above entitled matter are as follows: That 
the policy which is the subject matter of this action was 
a policy of Old American Insurance Company, 4900 Oak 
Street, Kansas City, Missouri, being Policy Number V36,-
810 issued to the insured, Arthur Whitlock, General De· 
liv~ry, Enterprise, Utah, Beneficiary, Opal Whitlock, 
wife, and that plaintiff's Exhibit 1 is a true and correct 
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copy of said policy. Said policy makes a provision for 
the payment of loss of life benefit of $2400.00 with the 
further provision that in the event this is paid, it is in 
lieu of all othet benefits. That said policy was very lim-
ited, being for a very minor premium, to-wit, $12.00 a 
year. Part Three thereof, under the heading of Exclu-
sions reads as follows: 
"This policy does not cover any loss or disability 
resulting directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, 
from (a) any mental or bodily sickness or disease, 
or (b) intoxication of the Insured, or (c) war or any 
act incident thereto, or (d) bodily injuries sustained 
while engaged as a volunteer or paid fireman or law 
enforcement officer, or (e) while driving or riding 
in any automobile engaged in a race or speed test, 
or (f) while driving any automobile for compensa-
tion or hire; nor does it cover (g) any period of dis-
ability during which the Insured is not under the 
regular care of a licensed physician, surgeon or os-
teopath." 
The interpretation of these exclusions is the material 
matter of this particular case. The insured, Arthur Whit-
lock, had been operated on for cancer approximately 
May of 1962. He was incapacitated at the time and after 
the i·emoval of a lung because of cancer, the insured, 
Arthur Whitlock, went home to pass his remaining days, 
and on or about the 24th day of September, 1962, he had 
his son take him to Cedar City for a check up. Shortly 
before the vehicle in which they were traveling arrived 
at Cedar City, Utah, it was involved in an accident. There-
after, Mr. Whitlock was hospitalized until on or about 
the 18th day of October, 1962, at which time he expired. 
A doctor, A. L. Graff, M. D., of Cedar City, Iron County, 
State of Utah, signed a death certificate in the follow-
ing language: "Metastatic Carcinoma", and in a lay-
man's language, the cause of death as shown by the 
death certificate was lung cancer. With lung cancer 
being the cause of death, this does not come under the 
provisions of the policy hereinabove identified, and pay-
ment provisions for loss of life have never become ef-
fective. The defendant did tender $272.00 for hospitali-
zation as a result of the accident, which has not been 
cashed and has not been returned. The cause of death 
wus such that it did not come under the provisions of 
the insurance policy for payment of the loss of life ben-




THE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO SUBMIT ANY EVI-
DENCE EITHER TO SUBSTANTIATE VERDICT 
OR TO PLACE DEATH UNDER SAID INSURANCE 
POLICY. 
Very probably the basic question in connection with 
this matter is whether or not the cause of death was such 
that it could be interpreted as under the policy. This 
policy which was before the trial court and which is be-
fore the Supreme Court as Exhibit No. 1, across its face 
bears the stamp "THIS IS A LIMITED POLICY, READ 
IT CAREFULLY," and "THIS POLICY PROVIDES BEN-
EFITS FOR LOSS OF LIFE, LIMB, SIGHT OR TIME 
AND HOSPITALIZATION FROM ACCIDENTAL BOD-
ILY INJURY, TO THE EXTENT HEREIN PROVIDED." 
Under the heading "Loss of Life" the policy makes 
the following statement: 
"LOSS OF LIFE. When injuries sustained as the re-
sult of any accident covered by this policy cause the 
loss of the Insured's life within thirty days from the 
date of the accident, the Company will pay the 
amount specified therefor in the Amount of Bene-
fits Schedule. Such payment shall be in lieu of all 
other benefits under the policy." 
Thereafter, under the heading, "Part Three, Exclu-
sions" there is the following statement: 
"This policy does ~cover any loss or disability 
resulting directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, 
from (a) any mental or bodily sickness or disease, 
or (b) intoxication of the Insured, or (c) war or 
any act incident thereto, or ( d) bodily injuries sus-
tained while engaged as a volunteer or paid fireman 
or law enforcement officer, or (e) while driving or 
riding in any automobile engaged in a race or speed 
test, or (f) while driving any automobile for com-
pensation or hire; nor does it cover (g) any period 
of disability during which the Insured is not under 
the regular care of a licensed physician, surgeon or 
osteopath." 
While the trial court found, with the jury verdict, 
that plaintiff should recover $2400.00, which in effect 
means that the trial court found that the death did come 
within the provisions of the policy, and to do this it 
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would have to find that the death did not in any way 
"directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, from any 
mental or bodily sickness or disease," it is extremely 
hard to reconcile a finding of this nature with the facts. 
It was admitted quite freely by all parties that the in-
sured was dying from cancer. The death certificate was 
put in evidence as Defendant's Exhibit No. 3, and said 
death certificate bears no reference to any cause except 
the cancer. 
The only qualified person who testified concerning 
the cause of death was Dr. A. L. Graff who was also the 
doctor who signed the death certificate. In relation to 
this matter, there was never any question in Dr. Graff's 
entire testimony but that the cancer, if not the exclus-
ive cause of death, was at least a contributing cause of 
death. In the Reporter's transcript of testimony which 
has been included in the Designation of Record in the 
above entitled matter, Dr. Graff's testimony runs from 
Page 63 to Page 91. Dr. Graff had known Mr. Whitlock 
for ten or fifteen years before death. This may be found 
in Reporter's transcript beginning on Line 17 of Page 
63, in which Dr. Graff was asked, in line 20, "How long 
did you know Mr. Whitlock?" by counsel, and the answer 
was, "Oh, ten of fifteen years, I imagine." Then on Page 
65, plaintiff's attorney asked, on Line 22, "Doctor, over 
the period of time, what did you observe with respect 
to his symptoms and--", and the answer, commencing 
on Line 24, is as follows, "Well, I knew he had cancer of 
the lung, which had been operated on, metastasis of the 
liver." In relation to the injury having anything to do 
with the death, on cross-examination, Page 67, Line 
2, the doctor was asked, "What was the extent of the 
skull injuries?" And his answer was, on Line 3, "Well, 
the only thing that demonstrated was the external hem-
a to ma and then the fact he was knocked out, so he told 
me. He was out, so he had a concussion, naturally." And 
upon being cross-examined about the death certificate, 
the following questions and answers took place, begin-
ning on Page 69, on Line 25 of the transcript of the tes-
timony: 
Q Doctor, look closer at this document. Right here, 
(indicating) you have immediate cause of death, 18-a. 
A Yes. 
Q How do you pronounce those words? 
A Metastatic carcinoma. 
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Q What does this mean? 
A Carcinoma travels from the original site, which 
was the lung, to the other parts of the body; and the ones 
I could feel was the liver, and it could have been through 
the brain, but I am not sure. 
Q Then, can you tell me what that is? 
A Well, that is carcinoma. 
Q What does that all mean when we take the med-
ical terminology out of it and put it where we understand 
it? 
A Well, it means he had a cancer of the lung and 
they had removed it; but before they removed it, part 
of the cancer cells had scattered into other parts of the 
body. 
Q And, in other words, the immediate cause of death 
in your death certificate was cancer? 
A That is what I put down. 
Then concerning other parts of the death certifi-
cate, on Page 70 of the transcript, Line 29, the doctor 
was asked the question, "Now, I call your attention here 
to Part 2 under Item 18, 'Other significant conditions 
contributing to death but not related to the terminal 
disease condition given in Part 1-a above.' What did 
you write in there?" And his answer, Page 71, Line 2, 
was, "Well, there isn't any writing in there. I wrote it 
down below here. (Indicating.)" 
A complete examination of the testimony of Dr. 
Graff shows that at no time did he ever feel that the 
cancer was not a contributing factor to the death, even 
though it was quite apparent that he was attempting to 
testify in favor of the plaintiff. There is no question that 
the doctor, at the time of signing the death certificate, 
felt that the cancer was the cause of death. In interpret· 
ing the hospital records that were offered in evidence 
as defendant's Exhibit 4, Page 86 of the transcript, com-
mencing on Line 12, and running through line 19, the 
doctor was asked, "Now, Doctor, I call your attention 
to the first page in the record as it now stands after the 
other sheet has been removed. Would you examine that, 
please and on the right side under Systematic Review, 
there is the notation, 'The cancer in liner enlarged very 
rapidly and patient finally died.' Is that in your hand 
writing?" The answer was, "That is." Then at the bot· 
tom of Page 86, on line 30, the doctor \Vas asked, " 'Phy-
sical findings, metastatic carcinoma of liner can be felt, 
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pulse rapid and weak.' Is that in your hand writing?" 
The answer, Page 87, Line 2, was "Yes, sir." 
Thereafter, there was a discussion on the word 
' "liner" and it became clarified that the witness meant 
"liver." 
When one compares the nature of Dr. Graff's tes-
timony with the language of the policy, it becomes quite 
apparent that even under conditions in which Dr. Graff 
was attempting to make a very favorable impression 
for the plaintiff, he could not at any time testify that 
the cancer was not at least a contributing factor to the 
cause of death. Under these conditions, the exclusion pro-
visions of the policy takes the death out from un-
der the provisions of the policy and even under the most 
favorable interpretation there should be no payment of 
death benefits under this policy. 
Point II 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 SUBMITTED THE CASE TO 
THE JURY ON A STANDARD DIFFERENT FROM 
THAT EXPRESSED IN THE POLICY. 
Defendant's requested instructions, Nos. 3, 4, and 5, 
none of which were given, and the failure to give of 
which was objected to by the defendant, set forth the 
standard that was in line with the language of the pol-
icy. The policy, as has been previously stated, required 
the finding that there was no contributing health cause 
in the death. It is quite apparent that the death was a 
cancer death, or at least that the cancer contributed 
thereto. Defendant's requested Instruction No. 3, required 
an interrogatory type verdict which would have placed 
the matter squarely on cancer or some other cause. De-
fendant's requested Instruction No. 4 required the jury 
to made a finding that the death was caused by the ac-
cident before there could be any award outside of the 
sum of $272.00 already tendered. Also it placed squarely 
upon the jury the task of interpreting the contract of 
insurance. Instruction No. 5 requested by the defendant 
specifically set forth the death certificate as the prima 
facie evidence of the cause of death and required a def-
inite affirmative finding of any other cause of death 
before there was any variation thereof. These requested 
instructions are quite material when one finds in item 
18 of the death certificate which is before the court as 
defendant's Exhibit No. 3: "Cause of Death, Part I. 
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Death was caused by: Immediate cause (a) Metastatic 
Carcinoma, due to (b) Carcinoma of Lung" which in 
evc1·yday language is "lung cancer," and then in Part II 
' the death certificate contains the following statement: 
"Other significant conditions contributing to death but 
not related to the terminal disease condition given in 
Part (a), and one finds that this particular portion was 
left blank and not answered. 
The trial court, however, in violation of request, 
and in violation of the language of the policy, in its In-
struction No. 4, in paragraphs 3 and 4 thereof, instructed 
the jury as follows: 
"You are instructed further that if you find from 
a preponderance of the evidence that the plaintiff's 
deceased husband, Arthur Whitlock, died as a re-
sult of injuries received in such an accident and 
where death occurred within thirty days of the 
date of accident, where the said injuries so received 
in the said accident materially and substantially 
contributed to cause his death, then you should 
find the plaintiff entitled to recover from the de-
fendant under the policy provisions for the sum 
and amount of $2,400. 
"If on the other hand you cannot so find from the 
preponderance of the evidence either that the plain-
tiff's deceased's husband died as a direct result of 
injuries received in the accident, or that such death 
did not occur within the thirty day period from the 
date of the accident, or that the injuries received 
in the accident did not materially and substantially 
contribute to cause his death, then and in that event 
you should find that the plaintiff is entitled to re-
cover from the defendant only for the hospital and 
disability benefits." 
The sum total of Instruction No. 4 as given by the 
trid court changed the standard from that set forth in 
t,'1e policy to the standard of materially and substan-
tially contributing to the cause of the death, and turned 
the matter "'ide open for jury speculation. 
It is tu be noted that the jury was instructed with-
out counsel being given an opportunity to read any in-
~;truc°dorn,, and after a request for a continuance until 
mornin[;", by the defendant, said request being made at 
5.~'5 111 the evening, the jury was instructed at 7:00 o'-
clock; the trial court was in an extreme hurry, and the 
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instructions of the court were read without an oppor-
tunity of counsel to examine the instructions before 
reading by the court. At the conclusion of the reading 
of the instructions, but before argument, counsel asked 
to approach the bench, and raised the question of In-
struction No. 4 being in language different from that in 
Lhe policy. The transcript of the testimony simply shows 
that counsel approached the bench, on Line 2, Page 
151. After the jury retired, a record was made of the 
previous conversation at the bench before the argument. 
On Page 152 at Line 8, the record was established: "I 
wish to object, your Honor, as a matter of record and 
lo make this a matter of record, that the instructions 
were handed to counsel and given to the jury before 
counsel had a chance to read them and that upon read-
ing them and after they had been read to the Jury be-
fore the matter was argued, that the defendant raised 
a question on Instruction Number 4, that it is not the 
language of the contract and was misled--," whereupon 
the court interrupted on Line 16 as follows: "This is 
true, the record will show that Mr. Fenton and Mr. Burns 
did come up to the bench and that the attention of the 
Court was drawn with particularity to Instruction 
Number 4 and particularly the last paragraph thereof. 
I believe you pointed that out, Mr. Fenton." And on 
Line 22 the answer is, "That's correct." The court there-
upon continued on Line 23: "And at that time, you, I 
believe, exhibited to me a photocopy, I presume it was, 
of the Exhibit Number 1. Frankly, I had not read Exhibit 
Number 1. I don't think that I read any of the exhibits, 
for that matter, in total. In any event, I interrupted you." 
Then the record continues on Line 29 of Page 152, 
and on to Page 153, "And may the record also show that 
your honor overruled counsel's objection to this Instruc-
tion Number 4 in the present form at that time." The 
Court answered: "Yes, I did so." This amounts to the 
sum total that the court failed to read the contract, in-
structed the jury, and failed to give counsel an oppor-
tunity to read the instructions before they were given 
to the jury, and when the question of the variance was 
rnised, refused to make an adjustment thereon, even 
though the question of variance was raised before ar-
gument, which was the first opportunity counsel had 
to raise any question as to the variance between the in-
structions and the contract. 
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Utah law is quite clear that any time there is a ques-
tion of an accident, with an existing disease, and the 
existing disease, which cooperating with the accident, 
results in injury or death, the accident is not the sole 
cause or the cause independent of all other causes 
within the meaning of an accident policy. Under these 
conditions, we are now before the Court with the ques-
tion of whether or not the accident, if any injury oc-
curred therefrom, was the sole and existing cause of 
death, and there is absolutely no proof that it was even 
a contributing cause to the death. Under these conditions, 
the action of the trial court in allowing the matter to 
be speculated on with an erroneous instruction, cer-
tainly raised a presumption of prejudice on the part of 
the court, and against the defendant. Utah law is quite 
clear on the point pertaining to a policy of this nature. 
A great deal of the law that has been written comes 
under double indemnity clauses when the death is caused 
by accident. Utah law holds that wherever there is a 
double indemnity clause or a triple indemnity clause 
in an insurance policy, in the event a death is caused 
by accident, that the accident must be the sole cause 
of the death, or the cause independent of all other 
causes within the meaning of an accident policy, and 
is the proper standard to apply to the matter before the 
Court. Browning vs. Equitable Life Assurance Society 
of the United States, 94 Utah 532, 72 Pac. 2d 1060, inso-. 
far as the principal case is concerned a::d the rehearing 
on same, found at 94 Utah 570, 80 Pac. 2d 348, sets forth 
a very comprehensive discussion of this type of insur-
ance policy. This takes in a situation where the acci-
dent is not the sole cause, but where it, together with 
the disease, are cooperating causes of death, which 
would be much more favorable to the plaintiff than the 
case at hand, and comes up with the conclusion as fol-
lows: 
"When at the time of an accident there was an ex-
isting disease, which cooperating with the accident 
resulted in injury or death, the accident is not the 
sole cause or the cause independent of all other 
causes within the meaning of an accident policy." 
This is much stronger than our case at hand. The 
most favorable construction we could get from the tes-
timony and the evidence from the stanrlpoint of the 
plaintiff is that we have a death certificate that says 
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death was caused by cancer, and the report submitted 
by the plaintiff in Exhibits 5, 6, 7 and 8, to the Company 
indicate that i:Le death was caused by the cancer; then 
in the later report, that the accident was a contribut-
ing cause, and the strongest the doctor would say about 
signing the death certificate was that he meant to put 
that the accident might have had something to do with 
the death on the death certificate. This is quite differ-
ent from the situation in the Brovvning case where there 
was a bona fide question that the accident was not the 
sole cause, and where it, together with the disease are 
cooperating causes of death. In our case at hand, there 
is no question. 
In the case of Handley vs. Mutual Life Insurance 
Company of New York, which can be found at 106 Utah 
184, 147 P. 2d 319, the same doctrine is ratified, which 
quotes the Browning case by the Utah State Supreme 
Court. Also in the case of Tucker vs. New York Life 
Insurance Company, 107 Utah 478, 155 P 2d 173, on 
Page 482 in the Utah Report, The Utah State Supreme 
Court, again in construing the language of the insurance 
contract, referring to the Browning case, goes into three 
classes of cases in which this situation arises, and a 
quotation is as follows: 
"When at the time of the accident there was an 
existing disease which, cooperating with the acci-
dent, resulted in the injury or death, the accident 
cannot be considered as the sole cause, or as the 
cause independent of all other causes. Smith vs. 
Federal Life Ins. Co., D. C., 6 f. 2d 283; Cretney v 
Woodmen Acc. Co., 196 Wis. 29, 219 N. W. 448, 62 
A. L. R. 675; Leland v Order of United Commercial 
Travelers of America, 233 Mass. 558, 124 N. E. 517, 
520." 
In all of the;:;e transactions, there is a far more favor-
able situation to the plaintiff than the case at hand. In 
all of these cases there is a cooperating existing disease. 
In the matter at bar, the most favorable we can say the 
plaintiff's position is that the accident might have been 
some contributing factor, and that until the lawsuit 
was thought of, there was never an indication of the ac-
cident having anything to do with the death. It was 
simply a case of death by cancer. 
There is quite a revealing discussion in Corpus 
Juris and Corpus Juris Secundum about the same def-
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inition, which endorses the action of the Utah Supreme 
Court. They also approach it from a slightly different 
standpoint, and in doing so again quote the Brovming 
case. In 45 Corpus Juris Secundum, Page 785 in Section 
756 under Insurance pertaining to the proximate cause 
of injury or death as a heading, in connection with 
double indemnity and other cases of that nature, there 
is the following quote: 
"The accident must be the proximate cause of the 
injury, disability, or death for which indemnity is 
claimed, in order to hold the insurer liable therefor." 
It goes on to express the thought that the accident must 
be the proximate cause of the injury, disability, or death 
for which the indemnity is claimed, and insurer cannot 
be held liable if the accident was not the proximate 
cause, or was only a remote cause, although the injury 
was a result of insured's conduct as an intervening cause. 
This is in language that is nearly as strong as the lan-
quage of the policy that is before the court at this time. 
A footnote in citing the Browning vs. Equitable Life 
Assurance case cited above, states that the accident 
policy can have no broader meaning than the words 
used in the policy, to-wit, "sole proximate cause" and 
indicates that the death must be the exclusive result 
of the accidental means. 
It seems that under the circumstances, where the 
court puts a jury on a different standard than the con-
tract, where it is called to the court's attention before 
argument, and exception is taken to the instruction 
that does so, after argument, there is no question but 
that the court was aware of the matter at the time and 
refused to make any adjustment whatsoever, and that 
under these conditions the court issued an instruction 
against objection and put the determination of a case 
concerning a contract on a different basis from that in 
the contract. Said instruction put the finding on a pre-
ponderance of evidence basis, rather than on the lan-
guage of the contract which was, "excluding any loss 
or disability resulting directly or indirectly, in whole 
or in part from any mental or bodily sickness or disease." 
There can be no question but that this exclusion was 
not complied with, and that the language of the court 
placed the jury on a different standard. 
In the case of Lee vs. New York Life Insurance 
Company, 95 Utah 445, 82 P. 2d 178, the Supreme court 
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of Utah differentiated between the Lee case and the 
Browning case, by and for the reason that there was 
conflicting testimony which the jury was justified in 
believing. In the case at bar there is no conflicting tes-
timony. There is no testimony whatsoever that goes 
farther than Dr. Graff's. The most Dr. Graff could say 
was that the accident might have contributed to the 
death. Under these conditrons, the case at bar is parallel 
with the Browning case. Nor does this conflict with the 
principle of the Browning case which takes the posi-
tion that an insured, to bring himself under the bene-
fits of the policy, after an accident has the affirmative 
duty of bringing himself under the terms of the policy. 
In the case of Tucker vs. New York Life Insurance 
Company, 107 Utah 478, 155 P. 2d 173, cited above, the 
Browning case is endorsed by the Utah State Supreme 
Court, and on Page 482, in discussing the three types of 
cases in which the court has to make the decision, and 
referring to the Browning case, and quoting from the 
Browning case, Classification (3) is as follows: 
"When at the time of the accident, there was an 
existing disease which, cooperating with the acci-
dent, resulted in the injury or death, the accident 
cannot be considered as the sole cause, or the cause 
independent of all other causes." 
Thereafter, there is a long list of citations. This is par-
ticularly interesting, in view of the circumstances as 
we have in the case at bar, in which the strongest inter-
pretation that can possibly be put upon Dr. Graff's lan-
guage is that the accident may have been a contribut-
ing cause. However, at no time has Dr. Graff eliminated 
the fact that the cancer was the cause of death, or at 
least was a contributing cause, and under those circum-
stances this accident cannot be considered as the sole 
cause, or the cause independent of all other causes, un-
der the interpretations of the Tucker case under any 
condition. Especially is this true when one becomes 
aware that everyone was simply waiting for Mr. Whit-
lock to die from cancer. 
Point III 
PLAINTIFF'S PROOF FAILED TO SHOW THAT 
THE CAUSE OF DEATH WAS COVERED BY POL-
ICY. 
Under the most liberal construction that can be 
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placed on the policy and Dr. Graff's testimony, there is 
no question that plaintiff failed to sustain her burden 
of proving that the accident was the cause of death. 
There is no question that the most liberal interpreta-
tion that can be put on plaintiff's proof is that a bodily 
sickness or disease at least contributed to the death. 
Although no autopsy was performed, and the doctor stat-
ed he could not be sure what was the cause of death 
without same, it was quite apparent from the doctor's 
testimony that in all probability if plaintiff had desired, 
she could have had the body exhumed, and could have 
provided more definite information. This was entirely 
under plaintiff's control, and when they did not do so, 
they abandoned any claim to rights under the particular 
policy, that might have been shown by an autopsy. It 
is the plaintiff's duty to provide the proofs under these 
circumstances. This is especially true, considering that 
the body is under the control of the plaintiff. Bearing in 
mind that on the official records the death was from 
cancer, there is no reason for payment of the insurance 
under this loss of life provision until such time as af-
firmative proof is provided by the plaintiff otherwise. 
This has not been done, and the plaintiff has failed in 
her duty of proof, regardless of the trial court's instruc-
tions. Based upon the standards as set forth in the Brown-
ing vs. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United 
States, as cited above, the Handley vs. Mutual Life In-
surance Company of New York, and the Tucker vs. New 
York Life Insurance Company, and the principles of the 
Utah Supreme Court as set forth in the Browning vs. 
Equitable Life Assurance Case, and implemented by 
the other cases, all to the effect that until such time as 
the plaintiff proves that the accident was the sole cause 
of death, there should be no payment under a policy 
of this nature, and the trial court and the jury both erred 
in connection with the trial of this matter. Defendant's 
requested Instruction No. 2 should have been given to 
the jury by the trial court, to-wit, "No cause of action." 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, the defendant-appellant is of the 
opinion that the trial court erred, and has shown bias 
and prejudice in that its Instruction Number 4 as given 
to the jury set the matter up on a standard of matcriall) 
and substantially contributing to the cause of death. This 
defendant-appellant is further of the opinion that there 
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was no proof offered whatsoever that would justify a 
decision under any circumstances in favor of the plain-
tiff. Under these conditions, it is the contention of this 
defendant-appellant that this matter should be reversed; 
that the $272.00 that was tendered to the plaintiff by 
the defendant-appellant shortly after the death should 
be awarded to Mrs. Whitlock without interest, and that 
from this amount there should be deducted the defend-
ant-appellant's court costs and cost of appeal. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PATRICK H. FENTON 
Attorney for 
Defendant-Appellant 
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